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Abstract
In this paper we use microdata on employment and earnings from a
variety of industrialised countries to investigate the family gap in pay –
the differential in hourly wages between women with children and
women without children. We present results from seven countries:
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany,
Finland, and Sweden. We find that there is a good deal of variation
across our sample countries in the effects of children on women’s
employment. We also find large differences in the effects of children on
women’s hourly wages even after controlling for differences between
women with children and women without children in characteristics
such as age and education.
Among the seven countries we study here, the United Kingdom
displays the largest wage penalties to children. The family gap in pay is
larger in the U.K. than in other countries because of the higher
propensity of U.K. mothers to work in low-paid part-time jobs but also
because even among full-timers, women with children in the U.K. are
lower paid relative to other women than are mothers in other countries.
Why does the family gap in pay vary so much across countries?
We find that the variation in the family gap in pay across countries is not
primarily due to differential selection into employment or to differences
in wage structure. We therefore suggest that future research should
examine the impact of family policies such as maternity leave and child
care on the family gap in pay.
1Introduction
Despite a good deal of progress in recent years, women still tend to have
lower employment rates than men and to earn lower hourly wages if
they do work. There is a large literature that examines the gender gap in
pay within countries and a growing literature that examines the gender
gap in pay across countries (see, for instance, Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1995,
1996, and 1999; Callan, Adams, Dex, Gustafsson, Schupp, and Smith,
1996). It is taken as given in these literatures that much of the differential
between women and men is due to the fact that women bear children
and have primary responsibility in most instances for caring or
arranging care for them. Studies within countries provide evidence of a
persistent family gap in pay between women with children and women
without children (see, for instance, Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel, 1999 on
the U.K., and Waldfogel, 1997a on the U.S.). However, evidence
comparing the family gap across countries has been lacking. Thus, we
do not know whether countries have similar family gaps, or whether
countries that have a larger family gap have a larger gender gap in pay.
We also do not know much about the relationship between the
employment effects of children and the wage effects of children. In
countries where children have a large negative effect on women’s
employment, do they also have a large negative effect on women’s
wages, or is the opposite true? Put another way, do women in some
countries accommodate their family responsibilities by reducing their
employment while women in other countries instead remain in
employment but at lower wages?
In this paper, we use microdata on employment and earnings from
seven industrialised countries to address these questions.  We find that
there are large differences across countries in the family gap in pay.
Among the seven countries we study here, the United Kingdom displays
the largest wage penalties to children, because of the higher propensity
of U.K. mothers to work in low-paid part-time jobs but also because
even among full-timers, women with children in the U.K. are lower paid
relative to other women than are mothers in other countries. We also
find that there appears to be a relationship between the gender gap and
family gap across countries. Countries where there is a large negative
effect of children on women’s pay tend to have a large gender gap in
pay as well, and countries where mothers have lower employment rates
have lower employment rates of women overall. We also find that in
2countries where children have a large negative effect on employment,
they tend to have a large negative effect on pay as well.
Background
Welfare state analysts such as Gosta Esping-Anderson (1990) typically
divide industrialised countries into three regime types: Anglo-Saxon or
Anglo-American; continental European; and Scandinavian or Nordic.1
As we can see in Figure 1, the ratio of female to male hourly earnings
has risen in countries from all three regime types in recent years.2 The
figure also shows that the gender gap tends to be smaller in the Nordic
countries and higher in the Anglo-American countries, with the
continental European countries displaying a mixed pattern. Some
analysts have linked these patterns to the pattern of family policy and
equal opportunity policy on offer in these countries, arguing for instance
that the Scandinavian countries’ strong female-male earnings ratios
reflect at least in part their strong family and equal opportunity policies
while the weak performance of the Anglo-American countries reflects
their more limited policies (Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel,
1998).3 Implicit in these analyses is the notion that lower wages for
women with children in countries without well-developed family
policies can go a long way towards explaining the higher gender gaps in
those countries. However, direct evidence on this point has been lacking.
Although there have been many analyses of the pay effects of children in
recent years in the United Kingdom (see for instance Joshi 1991) and the
United States (see for instance Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Neumark
                                          
1  See also Sainsbury (1995) whose typology takes gender more explicitly into
account.
2 Figure 1 is based on data on hourly earnings of non-agricultural workers in
selected industrialised countries. The U.K. data are from the Employment
Department Historical Abstract, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, and
subsequent Gazettes. The U.S. data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Canada data are from the Survey of Consumer Finances, provided
by Peter Kuhn. All other data are from the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics,
various years, updated from material provided by Francine Blau. We are
grateful to Wen-Jui Han for updating the data series and producing Figure 1
for us. For further information on the sources, see Blau and Kahn (1995),
Waldfogel (1998), and Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel (1998).
3 See also the work of Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (1998) who have examined
the differences in institutional structure across a range of industrialised
countries.
3and Korenman, 1994; Waldfogel 1997b), and at least one in Australia
(Baxter, 1992), studies of the pay effects of children in Scandinavian and
continental European countries have been much rarer.4 Moreover, even
where studies exist, it can be difficult to compare results across studies
given differences in samples, methodology, and so on. In this study, we
overcome that difficulty by conducting our own estimates of the family
gap in pay using comparable microdata from seven industrialised
countries. In the sections that follow, we describe the data and methods
and then present results. We conclude with suggestions for further
research.
Data and Methods
Our data come primarily from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a
project in Walferdange, Luxembourg that brings together comparable
microdata from a range of industrialised countries. We included in our
sample every Western industrialised country in the LIS database for
which gross hourly wages could be computed, in each case using the
most recent year of data currently available. Because the Swedish
dataset in LIS did not include earnings data, we instead used data from
the most recent year (1991) of the Swedish Level of Living Survey
(LNU), a nationally representative household dataset that is frequently
used in studies of labour supply and earnings.5 Our final sample
includes at least one representative of each regime type. Our sample
countries (and years) are: Australia (1994), Canada (1994), United
Kingdom (1995), and United States (1994) from the Anglo-American
group; Germany (1994) from continental Europe; and Finland (1991) and
Sweden (1991) from the Nordic group.
For each of our sample countries, we use a sample of prime-age
women and men, those between the ages of 24 and 44. We exclude
individuals younger than 24 in order to avoid estimating wage
equations for young people who are still in full-time education. We
                                          
4 An important exception is a recent study by Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrom, and
Vroman (1999) which found that in Sweden, children tended to have a
positive or not significant effect on women’s wages. See also Rosholm and
Smith (1996) who find no significant effects of children on women’s wages in
Denmark.
5 The Level of Living Survey is used by permission of the Swedish Institute for
Social Research in Stockholm, Sweden. For further information on this
dataset, see Fritzell and Lundberg (1998).
4exclude individuals older than 44 because women in that age range who
have no children are very likely to have had children in the past; thus,
including women older than 44 would confound our comparison of
women with children and women without children.
Our key outcome variables are: employment, defined as having a
job during the survey week; full-time employment, defined as having a
job during the survey week and working 30 or more hours per week;
gross hourly wages, defined as gross annual earnings divided by annual
hours worked (which is the product of weeks worked and hours worked
per week); and the log of hourly wages. Individuals who describe
themselves as self-employed are excluded from our sample, but all other
workers are included. We particularly wanted to include part-time
workers because of the importance of part-time work among women
with children. However, as detailed below, we conduct some analyses
separately for full-time workers due to concerns about measurement
error and part- time wages.6
The datasets held by LIS, and the LNU data for Sweden, contain
detailed demographic and human capital information that we use to
construct independent variables for our employment and wage models.
A description of these variables is provided in the Appendix.
Raw Gender and Family Gaps in Employment and Wages
Table 1 provides an overview of the raw gender and family gaps in
employment and full-time employment in our sample countries.
Comparing all women in a country to all men in the same country, we
find that the raw gender gap in employment ranges widely: it is largest
in Australia, where women’s mean employment rate is 24.8 percentage
points lower than men’s, and smallest in Sweden, where women’s rate is
4.3 points higher than men’s. However, even within countries, all
women are not alike. Women without children are generally much more
likely to work. In all but one of our sample countries, when we compare
women with children to women without children, we find a substantial
family gap in employment, ranging from a high of about 29 in Australia
                                          
6 For the most part, the data held by LIS have been cleaned and do not contain
extreme values. However, this was not the case for the wage data for the
United States. Therefore, for the U.S. sample, we had to exclude extreme wage
values (wages less than $2.00/hour or greater than $200/hour); this affected
only 1.3% of the observations in the U.S. sample.
5and the United Kingdom to a low of about 11 in Finland (the one
exception is Sweden, where the employment rate of women with
children is less than 1 percentage point lower than that of women
without children). Turning to full-time employment in panel B of the
Table, we find larger gender gaps but again a large range, with a high of
42.6 in Australia and a low of 0 in Finland, and even larger family gaps,
ranging from a high of 50.9 in the United Kingdom to a low of 13.4 in
Sweden.
Figure 2 shows how these mean employment rates vary by the age
of the youngest child. Across all but one of our sample countries
(Sweden again is the exception), employment rises as the age of the
youngest child rises, but there are some differences in timing. In
Australia and Germany, for instance, there is a sharp increase in
employment when the youngest child turns one and another large
increase as the youngest child moves from age five to age six or seven
(which may reflect women returning to work when their children start
school). In Canada and the U.S., employment is somewhat flatter in the
early years and then increases from age five to six (when children start
school), while in the U.K., employment is low (relative to Canada and
the U.S.) throughout the pre-school years but then rises to Canadian and
U.S. levels by age six. In Finland, employment rates rise as children age
from one and two to four, but from a fairly high base, while in Sweden,
employment rates hover at around 80 percent until children reach age
seven at which point they rise to 85 or 90 percent.  Interestingly,
employment rates become very similar across our sample countries by
the time children reach age 11 which probably reflects the fact that this is
when children leave primary school and start middle or secondary
school.
Table 1 and Figure 2 tell a fairly consistent story. Across our
countries, women, and especially women with children, have lower
levels of employment, with particularly large differences in mean levels
of full-time employment. Figure 2 indicates that these differences are
most pronounced for women with young children in most of our sample
countries.
Table 2 shows the ratio of women’s mean hourly wages to men’s
mean hourly wages for all women, and then women by family status, in
our sample countries, and here the story is not so consistent across
countries. The raw gender gap in pay varies a good deal by country,
ranging from a high of 25.4 percent in the United Kingdom to a low of
11.8 percent in Australia. The raw family gap in pay varies as well: in
five of our sample countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, and
6Sweden), women with children are paid about the same as or even more
than women without children, while in the other two (the United
Kingdom and the United States) there is a substantial family gap, 7.3
percent in the U.S. and 12.6 percent in the U.K. The pattern when only
full-time workers are considered is much more consistent across
countries, with the wages of women without children exceeding the
wages of women with children in each of our sample countries and with
the United Kingdom now looking much like the other countries. This
difference in results is due to the fact that women who work part-time
have much lower wages than full-time workers in the United Kingdom
(see, for instance, Harkness, 1996) and to a lesser extent in the United
States (see, for instance, Ferber and Waldfogel, 1998), whereas they are
observed to have higher hourly wages than full-time workers in the raw
data in several other of our sample countries. This latter finding raises
the possibility that some of the part-time wages are measured with error;
it is also possible that part-time workers in other countries do not face
the steep wage penalties that part-timers are known to face in the United
Kingdom and the United States.
The raw wage data in Table 2 indicate that there are substantial
differences in the earnings of women with children and women without
children in several of our sample countries, and in all our countries
when only full-timers are considered. The raw wage data also suggest
that there is some relationship between a country’s gender gap in pay
and its family gap in pay. When we plot a country’s gender gap in pay
and its family gap in pay (see Figure 3), we find that countries with
higher family gaps in pay do tend to have higher gender gaps in pay.
Interestingly, we also find that countries with higher gender
employment gaps tend to have higher family employment gaps (see
Figure 4).
The raw data can also tell us something about the relationship of
the employment and wage effects of children. Is it the case that countries
where the employment rate of mothers is much lower than that of other
women are also countries where the wages of mothers are much lower
than those of non-mothers? Or, is there a trade-off, such that women
with children either reduce their employment, or work at lower wages?
Figure 5, which plots a country’s employment gap between mothers and
non-mothers against its wage gap between mothers and non-mothers,
suggests that there is no simple relationship between a country’s family
gap in pay and its family gap in employment, but for the most part the
relationship appears to be positive.
7The raw data, however, can not tell us to what extent the
employment and wage gaps between mothers and other women simply
reflect differences in human capital or demographic characteristics
between the two groups. Therefore, in the next sections, we estimate the
effects of children on women’s employment and wages, controlling for
other characteristics.
The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment
We model a woman’s employment decision as a function of her
responsibility for children which we measure with a set of dummy
variables for the age of her youngest child, using the three categories
youngest child under age one (infant), youngest child age one to five
(pre-schooler), or youngest child age six to seventeen (school-age child).
Because the presence of a husband may affect a woman’s employment
decision, we also control for marital status by including a dummy
variable for being married.7 Our model also includes controls for the
following human capital and demographic variables: age and its square,
a set of dummy variables for level of education, a set of dummy
variables for ethnicity, the amount of other family members’ earnings,
the amount of other family income, and a set of dummy variables for
region and whether the woman resides in an urban area. We estimate
similar models for full-time employment (defined as working 30 or more
hours per week).
Results for our seven sample countries from linear probability
models of employment and full-time employment estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS) are shown in Table 3.8 In all four Anglo-
American countries and in Germany, the age of the youngest child
exerts a large influence on women’s employment. As suggested by the
raw data in Figure 2, employment of women in these countries rises
steadily as the youngest child ages. Marriage, in contrast, seems to be
less important, exerting a small positive effect in Canada and the U.K.,
and no significant effect in the other Anglo-American countries and
                                          
7 Means for the family status variables are shown in the Appendix. Note that
there may be some ambiguity in the coding for Germany, where we find very
few women with a child age 0 in the data. As noted in the appendix, the
category of married includes those living as married in all of our sample
countries except the U.S. and Germany.
8 Marginal effects from probit models, not shown here, display a similar
pattern.
8Germany. The results for the Nordic countries are different, as we might
have expected given the pattern of the raw data in Figure 2. In both
Finland and Sweden, women with infants and pre-school age children,
but not school age children, are significantly less likely to be employed,
but the effects are small (ranging from 9 to 12 percent) compared to the
effects for the Anglo-American countries and Germany.9 Marriage
lowers women’s employment in Sweden, but not in Finland.
The results for full-time employment are similar. We find very
large negative effects of children, generally declining by the age of the
child, in the Anglo-American countries and Germany.  The effects are
particularly large in the U.K., as would be expected given the greater
propensity of women with children to work part-time in that country as
compared to our other sample countries. In contrast, we find much
smaller effects of children in Finland and Sweden. Being married again
has a negative effect in Sweden; we also see a negative effect of being
married on full-time employment in Germany and the U.S., and a small
positive effect in Canada.
Although the pattern of results is similar for the four Anglo-
American countries and Germany, it is worth noting that the magnitude
of the effects varies a good deal across these countries. Children reduce
women’s employment much more in Australia, Germany, and the
United Kingdom than they do in Canada and the United States, with
particularly large effects for full-time employment in the U.K.. And, in
turn, children have a much larger effect on women’s employment in
these countries than they do in our two Nordic countries. This variation
across countries raises the question of the extent to which institutional or
policy differences might moderate the effects of children on women’s
employment and thus account for some of the differences across
countries. We discuss this question further below.
The Effects of Children on Women’s Wages
We estimate human capital earnings functions with the natural
logarithm of hourly wages as our dependent variable and a set of family
                                          
9 The small effect of children under the age of one on women’s employment in
Finland and Sweden probably reflects the fact that these countries have very
generous parental leave provisions which many women take advantage of.
Since women on maternity leave are counted as employed, the high share of
women taking maternity leave would boost the share employed among
women with children under the age of one.
9status and other variables (detailed below) as our independent variables.
To control for a woman’s responsibility for children, we include controls
for the number of children, with dummy variables for one child, two
children, or three or more children.
There are many reasons why children might affect women’s wages
(see Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1985; Hakim, 1996). Children
may affect women’s wages directly, by for instance lowering a woman’s
effort on the job, or indirectly, by for instance lowering the amount of
work experience and job tenure a woman accumulates over time. The
fact that women with children are lower paid may reflect choices
employees have made (for instance, to trade more flexible hours for
lower wages), or it may reflect employer preferences or discrimination.
Since we can not control for effort, experience, tenure, employee choices,
or employer preferences or discrimination in our datasets, we do not
place too strong an interpretation on the wage effects of children. We are
simply interested in finding out whether such effects exist in our sample
countries and how much they vary across countries once we control for
other characteristics.
Our wage model includes, in addition to the child variables,
controls for: marriage; age and its square; a set of dummy variables for
level of education; a set of dummy variables for ethnicity; and a set of
dummy variables for region and whether the woman lives in an urban
area. Because as noted earlier, we are concerned about the possibility of
measurement error in the part-time wages, we estimated this model
once for all workers and then for full-time workers only.10
The results of the wage models are shown in Table 4. In our results
for all workers, shown in panel 1, we find sizeable negative effects of
children on women’s wages in all four Anglo-American countries.
Because our dependent variable is the log of hourly wages, the
coefficients can be interpreted as percentage effects. Thus, looking at the
Anglo-American countries, we find a pay penalty for one child that
ranges from a low of about 4 percent in Canada and the U.S. to a high of
8 percent in the U.K., a pay penalty for two children that ranges from 5
percent in Canada to 24 percent in the U.K, and a pay penalty for three
                                          
10 We also estimated models in which we added a control for whether the
woman works part-time (less than thirty hours per week) since working part-
time may account for some of the lower wages of women with children. The
results of these models (not shown) suggest that although working part-time
does have a significant negative effect on women’s hourly wages in two of
our countries (the U.S. and U.K), significant negative effects of children in
those countries remain even after controlling for part-time working status.
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or more children that ranges from 10 percent in Australia to 31 percent
in the U.K.. It is worth noting that in each instance, the pay penalty to
children is higher in the U.K. than in the other Anglo-American
countries. The results for Germany are less conclusive, with an 11
percent penalty for two children but no significant penalties for one
child or for three or more children. In Finland, in contrast, we find only a
small penalty to one child (4 percent) or three or more children (6
percent), and no significant penalty for two children, while in Sweden,
we find no significant child penalties at all.
The second panel in the Table shows the results of the same model
but this time estimated only for full-time workers. When we restrict our
sample to full-time workers, we find generally larger negative effects of
children in five of our countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland,
and Sweden) and smaller effects in the other two countries (the U.K. and
U.S.). Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results is similar to that found
for all workers, with the largest pay effect of two or more children are
found in the U.K.. Thus, the lower pay of mothers in the U.K., relative to
other women in that country, is not due solely to the fact that they are
more likely to work in low-paid part-time jobs, since a substantial pay
penalty to children remains even among full-timers. At the other end of
the spectrum, the penalties become somewhat larger in Finland and
Sweden when we restrict the sample to full-time workers, but they are
still low relative to other countries. The results for the U.S. are also of
interest. Here, the child penalties become somewhat smaller when we
restrict the sample to full-time workers; indeed, the penalties in the U.S.
are comparable to those in the Nordic countries.
Taken together, these wage models provide fairly robust evidence
of negative pay effects of children across our sample countries. Even
more interestingly, they also provide evidence that these effects vary a
great deal by country. As noted above, we can not definitively explain
these negative pay effects of children – they may reflect individual
factors such as effort, experience, or tenure, or employee choices, or
employer factors such as preferences or discrimination that we do not
observe in our datasets11 – but it is worth speculating as to why they
vary so much across countries. We consider three alternative
explanations below.
                                          
11 Some portion of these pay penalties may be due to differences in the
occupations of women with children and women without children. We plan
to explore this in future research.
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Differential Selection
One possibility is that the difference in the negative pay effects of
children across countries reflects the differential selection of women into
employment across our sample countries. If women with children and
low earnings potential are more likely to work in the Anglo-American
countries, for instance, then the pool of working mothers might include
more women with lower wages and thus we would estimate a larger
negative effect of children on women’s pay. However, as we saw in
Figure 5 earlier, the employment and wage effects of children tend to be
correlated. In countries such as the Anglo-American group where
children have a large negative effect on wages, they also tend to have a
large negative effect on employment. This evidence does not support the
hypothesis that differential selection into employment plays an
important role in explaining the differences in the pay effects of children
across countries.
To test this hypothesis more formally, we estimated Heckman
(1979) sample selection correction models, using the age structure of the
children in the household, the amount of other family members’
earnings, and the amount of other family income as our identifying
variables. Specifically, we included in our wage models the same
variables as before (age, age squared, controls for level of education,
race/ethnicity, married, dummy variables for one child, two children, or
three or more, region, and urban residence), while including in our
employment probit models age, age squared, controls for level of
education, race/ethnicity, married, number of children under age 1,
number age 1 to 4, and number age 5 to 17, other family members’
earnings, other family income, region, and urban residence.12
The results, shown in Table 5, suggest that the estimated effects of
children on women’s pay are not affected a great deal by sample
selection bias. The sample selection correction term, lambda, is not
statistically significant in any of our countries except the U.S., where the
sample selection term, lambda, is strongly positive (suggesting that
women who work have higher wages than non-working women with
similar characteristics would have if they worked). And, the relative
ranking of the countries in terms of the magnitude of their family
penalties is much the same as it was in the uncorrected wage models,
shown in Panel 1 of Table 4: the U.K. has the largest pay penalties to
children, followed by the other three Anglo-American countries, then
                                          
12 We also estimated similar models for selection into full-time employment.
The results of these models are available upon request.
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Germany, and then the two Nordic countries. This evidence does not
favour selection as a primary reason for the differences in the family gap
in wages across countries.
Differences in Wage Structure
Another possibility is that the differences in the wage effects of children
across countries reflect differences in wage structure. A series of studies
by Blau and Kahn (1992, 1995, 1996, and 1998) have found that to a large
extent, the difference in the gender earnings gap across countries can be
explained by the difference in the extent of earnings inequality across
countries. Blau (1992) illustrates this by first ranking countries by their
gender earnings ratios and then ranking countries by their mean female
percentile in the male wage distribution. This exercise shows that a
country such as Sweden has a high gender earnings ratio (77.2 percent in
her data) in spite of having a relatively low female percentile (27.6) in
the male wage distribution, while a country such as the U.S. has a low
gender earnings ratio (66.9 percent) in spite of having a higher female
percentile (33.2) in the male wage distribution. The reason for this
discrepancy between the two measures is that the penalty for one’s
position in the wage distribution varies widely across countries,
depending on the dispersion of earnings in a country; in the above
example, the penalty for a low percentile position is greater in the U.S.
than in Sweden, because the U.S. has a more unequal wage structure.
Thus, if one wants to understand the difference in the gender pay gap
between two countries such as the U.S. and Sweden, taking wage
structure into account is important.13
This explanation, however, may not fit as well when it comes to
explaining differences in the family gap in pay across countries.
Consider Table 2, panel A, which shows that among all workers the
wages of women with and without children are nearly identical in
Finland and Sweden. In this case, wage structure would not explain the
smaller family gap in these two Nordic countries; the main reason for
the smaller family gap is that there is little or no difference in pay
between women with and without children, not that the difference is
penalised less than it is in other countries.
To illustrate this more clearly, we calculated the position of each
women in each country in the male earnings distribution in their
                                          
13 In a similar vein, Edin and Richardson (1999) find that changes in solidarity
wage policy have been an important factor in narrowing the gender earnings
gap within a country (Sweden) over time.
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country, and then calculated the average percentile ranking of women in
each country. The results are shown in Table 6. Looking first at the
results for all workers, we can see that in four countries there is at most a
1 or 2 point family gap as measured by the difference between the mean
percentile rankings of women with children and women without
children: in Australia, both women with children and women without
children have wages that are on average at about the 40th percentile of
the male wage distribution; in Canada, women with children are at the
38th percentile while women with children are a few points behind at
the 36th percentile; in Finland, women with children are at the 36th
percentile while women with children are 1 point behind at the 35th
percentile; and in Sweden, women with children are at the 32nd
percentile while women with children are 1 point behind at the 31st
percentile. The results for the other three countries are quite different: in
the United States and Germany, there is about a 6 point family gap, with
women without children at the 42nd (U.S.) or 43rd (Germany) percentile
and women with children at the 37th percentile; and in the U.K., the
family gap is over 11 points, with women without children at the 40th
percentile as compared to women with children at the 29th percentile.14
Overall, these results are quite consistent with the pattern of results we
obtain when we use the gender earnings ratio as our measure, as we can
see in Figure 6. On both measures, we find the largest family gaps in pay
in the U.S., Germany, and the U.K..
Following Blau (1992), it is informative to compare the rankings of
countries using the percentile position of women with their rankings
using the gender pay ratio, as this will tell us how important a role wage
structure plays in the differences across countries. Given our interest in
the position of women with children as compared to women without
children, we compare these groups separately, as shown in Figure 7.
Looking first at the non-mothers, we find that using the mean
percentile ranking as opposed to the mean gender pay ratio changes the
ranking of our countries a good deal, with only two of our seven
countries (Germany and Finland) not changing position. However, there
is relatively little spread between countries to start with, since across all
                                          
14 When we restrict the analysis to full-time workers only, the percentile ranking
of U.K. women with children improves dramatically, which makes sense
given the links in that country between motherhood, part-time work, and low
pay, whereas we find the opposite result for Sweden, where as we saw earlier
the wages of mothers who work full-time tend to be somewhat lower than
those of mothers who work part-time.
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seven, the pay ratio of non-mothers relative to men is in the range of 82
to 88 percent.
When we turn to mothers, we find a much larger spread, with the
pay ratio of mothers relative to non-mothers ranging from a low of 70
percent in the U.K to a high of 91 percent in Australia. In contrast to our
results for non-mothers (and to Blau’s (1992) results for women overall),
measuring mothers’ pay by their mean percentile ranking in the male
distribution does not for the most part alter the ranking of the countries.
Only two countries change position: Sweden moves down from 3rd to
6th place while the U.S. moves up.
Thus, wage structure seems to be important in understanding why
mothers are lower paid relative to men in the U.S. than they are in
Sweden. But, at the same time, wage structure does not help very much
in explaining why mothers are lower paid relative to non-mothers. If a
country such as the U.K. adopted Sweden’s pay structure, this would
reduce the penalty that mothers face in the labour market for being at a
lower percentile in the male wage distribution but it would not change
the fact that they are at a lower position. More generally, changing the
pay structure would not eliminate the family gap in pay in the U.K. or
the U.S. or Germany, since mothers in those countries are at a much
lower percentile ranking than non-mothers to start with.
Differences in Family Policy
A third possible explanation for the differences in the family gap in pay
across countries is the variation in family policy. We are not able to
examine this explanation here, because we have data from only one
point in time.15 Thus, whether adopting changes in family policy such as
maternity leave or child care would improve the pay position of mothers
is an open question. It is possible that the parity achieved by Nordic
mothers relative to non-mothers comes about as a result of their
extensive family policies, which support the labour force attachment of
women with children and thus are likely to raise women’s levels of work
experience and job tenure (Waldfogel, 1998; Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel,
1998). But this parity may come at the price of lower wages for women
overall, if employers shift the costs associated with such policies to those
perceived to be most likely to benefit from them, namely, women. The
low position of all Swedish women in the male wage distribution may
                                          
15 We hope to be able to address this issue in future work, by using multiple
wave of data from LIS in conjunction with data on policies and institutions in
the various countries.
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reflect the price women pay for Sweden’s extensive family policy
supports, or it may reflect other factors entirely. More research on this
question, and on the impact of family policies more generally on the
employment and pay of mothers, and non-mothers, is warranted.
Conclusions
This paper is the first to tackle the question of whether the family gap in
pay that has been documented for some Anglo-American countries is
unique to those countries or whether a comparable gap is found in other
Western industrialised countries. The results for the seven countries
examined here indicate that, controlling for differences in earnings-
related characteristics, the effect of children on women’s pay is largest in
the United Kingdom (in large part, because of the tendency of mothers
in the U.K. to work in poorly paid part-time jobs), followed by the other
Anglo-American countries and Germany, and smallest in the Nordic
countries.
We also sought to learn whether there is a link between the family
gap and gender gap in pay across countries, such that countries with
higher family gaps tend to have larger gender gaps as well. This was in
fact the case in our data, as we saw in Figure 3, with the U.K. displaying
both the largest gender gap and the largest family gap in pay. We also
examined the relationship between the employment gap between
mothers and other women, and the wage gap between mothers and
other women, and found that they were positively correlated. Thus, we
found no evidence that women with children make a choice between
lower employment or lower wages; the two seem to go together. This
suggests that the high pay penalty to children in the U.K., for instance, is
not simply due to the fact that women with children are more likely to
work in that country. We tested this more formally by estimating models
corrected for sample selection bias, but again we found little evidence to
support the hypothesis that differential selection into employment
accounts for the differences in the family gap across countries. Nor did
we find much evidence that differences in wage structure explain the
cross-country differences in the family gap.
Why does the family gap in pay vary so much across countries?
What role do family policies such as maternity leave and child care play
in closing the pay gap between mothers and other women? And what
impact do such policies have on the pay of women overall? This study,
16
using data from one point in time, could not answer these questions, but
our results suggest that they are worth investigating in future.
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Table 1: Employment Rates of Men and Women Age 24-44 in the
Sample Countries
A. Share
Employed
AU 1995
(N=4,980)
CN 1994
(N=30,227)
UK 1995
(N=4,403)
US 1994
(N=39,540)
GE 1994
(N=5,113)
FI 1991
(N=9,804)
SW 1991
(N=2,184)
All men  .866  .780  .812  .856  .871  .704  .793
All women  .618  .683  .640  .660  .700  .738  .836
Women
without
children
 .813  .780  .840  .788  .822  .814  .842
Women with
children
 .520  .639  .552  .598  .639  .706  .833
Gender gap
(line 2 – line 1)
-.248 -.097 -.170 -.196 -.171  .034  .043
Family gap
(line 4 – line 3)
-.293 -.141 -.288 -.190 -.183 -.108 -.009
B. Share
Employed FT
AU 1995 CN 1994 UK 1995 US 1994 GE 1994 FI 1991 SW
1991
All men  .834  .752  .799  .833  .842  .695  .771
All women  .408  .518  .411  .564  .509  .695  .653
Women
without
children
 .721  .661  .764  .730  .724  .794  .745
Women with
children
 .253  .452  .255  .483  .402  .655  .611
Gender gap
(line 1 – line 2)
-.426 -.234 -.388 -.269 -.333  .000 -.118
Family gap
(line 3 – line 4)
-.468 -.209 -.509 -.247 -.322 -.139 -.134
Notes: Authors’ estimates from LIS data. Employment is defined as the share who
have a job during the survey week. Full-time employment is defined as the share
who have a job during the survey week and who work 30 or more hours per week.
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Table 2: Mean Hourly Wages of Women as a Percentage of Mean
Hourly Wages of Men in the Sample Countries
A. Women’s
Wage / All
Men’s Wage (in
%)
AU 1994
(N=3,474)
CN 1994
(N=20,497)
UK 1995
(N=3,166)
US 1994
(N=32,806)
GE 1994
(N=3,607)
FI 1991
(N=7,604)
SW 1991
(N=1,755)
All women  88.2  81.9  74.6  78.3  86.6  81.7  83.9
Women
without
children
 84.5  81.8  82.2  82.9  88.2  82.0  85.0
Women with
children
 91.4  82.0  69.6  75.6  85.5  81.6  83.4
Gender gap
(line 1-100%)
- 11.8 - 18.1 - 25.4 -21.7 -13.3 -18.3 -16.1
Family gap
(line 3-line 2)
6.9   0.2 - 12.6 - 7.3 - 2.7 - 0.4 - 1.6
B. FT Women’s
Wage / FT
Men’s Wage
(in %)
AU 1994
(N=2,909)
CN 1994
(N=17,743)
UK 1995
(N=2,573)
US 1994
(N=27,400)
GE 1994
(N=3,135)
FI 1991
(N=6,813)
SW 1991
(N=1,541)
All FT  84.2  75.6  81.1  79.0  83.8  78.8  82.7
FT without
children
 84.8  78.8  83.2  83.4  88.3  80.4  85.6
FT with
children
 83.4  73.4  78.5  74.7  79.3  78.0  81.0
Gender gap
(line 1-100%)
-15.8 -24.4 -18.9 -21.0 -16.2 -21.2 -17.3
Family gap
(line 3-line 2)
- 1.4 - 5.4 - 4.7 - 8.7 - 9.0 - 2.4 - 4.6
Note: Wages are defined as gross annual earnings divided by annual hours worked
(the product of weeks worked and hours per week).
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Table 3: Effects of Marriage and Age of Youngest Child on Women’s
Employment, Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from OLS Models
A. Employment
AU 94 CN94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035
(.023)
.056**
(.009)
.049**
(.022)
-.003
(.007)
-.018
(.023)
.008
(.017)
-.065*
(.036)
Child Age
<1
-.576**
(.035)
-.233**
(.015)
-.363**
(.034)
-.242**
(.013)
-.442**
(.163)
-.104**
(.030)
-.115*
(.069)
Child age
1-5
-.349**
(.024)
-.183**
(.010)
-.313**
(.023)
-.185**
(.008)
-.305**
(..027)
-.102**
(.018)
-.089**
(.033)
Child 6-17 -.152**
(.023)
-.076*
(.009)
-.085**
(.024)
-.060**
(.008)
-.096**
(.024)
.023
(.017)
-.002
(.034)
N 2,669 16,077 2,438 22,091 2,372 4,870 1,060
Adj R2 .2133 .1498 .2768 .1160 .1351 .1545 .0597
B. Full-time Employment
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .003
(.023)
.020**
(.009)
.007
(.022)
-.022**
(.008)
-.084**
(.024)
-.017
(.018)
-.090*
(.046)
Child age
<1
-.595**
(.034)
-.250**
(.016)
-.474**
(.034)
-.280**
(.014)
-.483**
(.169)
-.098**
(.031)
-.028
(.090)
Child age
1-5
-.496**
(.023)
-.246**
(.010)
-.519**
(.023)
-.264***
(.009)
-.450**
(.028)
-.134**
(.019)
-.146**
(0.42)
Child 6-17 -.326**
(.023)
-.129**
(.010)
-.356**
(.024)
-.120**
(.009)
-.242**
(.025)
.012
(.017)
-.096**
(.043)
N 2,654 16,077 2,438 21,682 2,372 4,870 1,060
Adj R2 .2678 .11158 .3141 .1154 .2220 .1574 .0547
Notes: Employment and full-time employment models also include controls for age,
age squared, education, race or ethnicity (except in Sweden), presence of a working
husband/partner, other family members’ earnings, other family income, region, and
urban residence (except in Germany). See appendix for variable definitions.
Complete regression results are available from the authors on request.
* indicates statistically significant at p<.10
** indicates statistically significant at p<.05
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Table 4: Effects of Marriage and Children on Log of Women’s Hourly
Wages, Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from OLS Regressions
1. All workers
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035
(.038)
-.008
(.016)
.043
(.027)
.072**
(.009)
-.037
(.031)
.037**
(.017)
.033*
(.018)
One child -.074
(.045)
-.037**
(.018)
-.082**
(.030)
-.039**
(.011)
-.017
(.034)
-0.42**
(.018)
-.008
(0.21)
Two
children
-.107**
(.044)
-.053**
(.018)
-.243**
(.030)
-.074**
(.012)
-.112**
(.039)
-.025
(.018)
-.014
(.021)
Three or
more
children
-.101*
(.058)
-.126**
(.024)
-.306**
(.042)
-.114**
(.014)
.022
(.061)
-.058**
(.023)
-.025
(.025)
N 1,547 10,219 1,564 15,307 1,515 3,592 874
Adj R2 .0635 .0936 .2967 .2297 .1352 .2473 .1787
2. Full-time workers only
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .028
(.036)
-.004
(.016)
.018
(.030)
.075**
(.010)
.002
(.030)
.024
(.015)
.037**
(.018)
One child -.122**
(.046)
-.058**
(.017)
.003
(.036)
-.025**
(.012)
-.032
(.035)
-.054**
(.016)
-.031
(.021)
Two
children
-.167**
(.048)
-.065**
(.018)
-.176**
(.037)
-.048**
(.012)
-.080*
(.041)
-.034**
(.017)
-.056**
(.021)
Three or
more
children
-.244**
(.073)
-.203**
(.025)
-.295**
(.054)
-.102**
(.016)
-.134**
(.078)
-.082**
(.022)
-.102**
(.027)
N 1,046 7,885 1,002 11,588 1,107 3,385 685
Adj R2 .0934 .1444 .3125 .2678 .1674 .3037 .1996
Notes: Log wage models include controls for age, age squared, education, race or
ethnicity (except for Sweden), region, and urban residence (except for Germany).
Model 1 is estimated for all workers; model 2 is estimated only for full-time workers
(those who work 30 or more hours per week). See appendix for variable definitions.
Complete regression results available from the authors on request.
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Table 5: Effects of Marriage and Children on Log of Women’s Hourly
Wages, Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from OLS Regressions,
Corrected for Sample Selection Bias
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .037
(.038)
-.009
(.017)
.048*
(.027)
.059**
(.010)
-.031
(.031)
.034**
(.017)
.033**
(.018)
One child -.086*
(.049)
-.035**
(.019)
-.093**
(.033)
-.067**
(.013)
-.019
(0.37)
-.044**
(.018)
-.006
(.021)
Two children -.120**
(.048)
-.050**
(.019)
-.255**
(.032)
-.105**
(.013)
-.107**
(.042)
-.027
(.019)
-.013
(.020)
Three or more
children
-.113**
(.061)
-.123**
(.026)
-.321**
(.044)
-.152**
(.016)
.003
(.064)
-.063**
(.024)
-.026
(.025)
Lambda .030
(.049)
-.011
(.033)
.031
(.034)
.162**
(.031)
.019
(.055)
.028
(.024)
-.028
(.043)
N 1,046 16,077 2,438 22,091 1,107 4,870 685
Notes: Log wage models include controls for age, age squared, education, race or
ethnicity (except for Sweden), region, and urban residence. Model is estimated for all
women in the sample using the standard sample selection correction technique as
described in the text . See appendix for variable definitions. Complete regression
results available from the authors on request.
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Table 6: Mean Percentile Ranking of Women in the Male Wage
Distribution
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW91
1. All women 40.19 37.15 33.54 38.78 39.48 35.75 30.95
2. All workers:
a. Women without
children
40.00 38.47 40.37 42.36 43.04 36.32 31.68
b. Women with
children
40.34 36.42 28.95 36.64 37.05 35.48 30.62
c. Family gap for all
workers
0.34 -2.05 -11.42 -5.72 -5.99 -0.84 -1.06
3. Full-time workers only
a. Women without
children
39.65 37.36 41.30 43.70 42.97 36.12 32.87
b. Women with
children
37.87 34.07 36.04 38.28 35.42 34.48 28.53
c. Family gap for full-
time workers
-1.78 -3.29 -5.26 -5.42 -7.55 -1.64 -4.34
Note: Percentile ranking in the male wage distribution is calculated for each woman,
and then the mean for all women in the group is calculated. The family gap for all
workers is the mean percentile ranking of women workers with children minus the
mean percentile ranking of women workers without children; the family gap for FT
workers is the mean percentile ranking of full-time women workers with children
minus the mean percentile ranking of full-time women workers without children.
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Figure 1: Female-male hourly earnings ratios, 1967-1995
27
Nordic countries
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
Year
R
at
io
Sweden Norway Denmark Finland
Figure 1 continued
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Figure 2: Share employed, by age of the youngest 
child
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Figure 3: Family Gap in Pay and Gender Gap in Pay
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Figure 4: The Family Gap in Employment and the 
Gender Gap in Employment
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Figure 5: The Family Gap in Pay and the Family Gap in 
Employment
Sweden
FinlandCanada
Germany
US
UK
Australia
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
-0.35 -0.30 -0.25 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00
Family Employment Gap
Fa
m
ily
 P
ay
 G
ap
 
32
Family gap in gender pay ratio
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Figure 6: Family gaps in the seven sample countries
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Figure 7: Rankings of the seven sample countries
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Mean percentile ranking, mothers
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Figure 7 continued
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
Employed Dummy variable for whether employed during survey
week.
Log wage Log of gross hourly wage (annual wage and salary
income divided by weeks worked and hours worked).
Age Age in years.
Age squared Age in years squared.
Married Dummy variable for whether married. Includes those
cohabiting or living together as married except in U.S.
and GE.
Child<1 Dummy variable for whether youngest child is under
age 1.
Child 1-5 Dummy variable for whether youngest child is age 1 to
5.
Child 6-17 Dummy variable for whether youngest child is age 6 to
17.
1 Child Dummy variable for having 1 child.
2 Children Dummy variable for having 2 children.
3+ Children Dummy variable for having 3 or more children.
Partner work Dummy variable for whether husband/partner works.
Other earn Other family members’ earnings.
Other income Other family income (total family income minus own
earnings and other earnings).
Education Dummy variables defined by country:
AU: 8 categories (no qualifications, basic vocational,
skilled vocational, associated diploma, undergraduate
diploma, bachelor degree, postgraduate diploma, higher
degree)
CN: 7 categories (grade 8 or lower, grade 9-10, grade
11-13 not h.s. grad, grade 11-13 h.s. grad, post-secondary
no degree, post sec. certificate or diploma, university
degree)
UK: 13 categories (left school age 0 to13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 or more)
US: 8 categories (elementary, some high school, high
school, some college, associate degree, bachelor degree,
masters, doctorate)
GE: 7 categories (no degree, other degree, secondary,
tech school degree, high school degree, technical college,
university)
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FI 7 categories (no years of schooling, 10-11, 12, 13-
14, 15, 16, post-grad education)
SW 8 categories (unspecified, primary 1, primary 2,
secondary 1, secondary 2, university 1, university 2,
research)
Race or Ethnicity/
National Origin
Dummy variables defined by country:
AU: 4 categories (Oceania, Antarctica, Europe or
USSR; Africa or Mideast; Asia; Americas)
CN: 3 categories (English, French, other)
UK: Not available
US: 6 categories (White, Black, Asian/Pacific
Islander, Eskimo/Aleut/Indian, Other Race, Hispanic)
GE: 7 categories (W. German-German, W. German-
Other, Foreign-German, Foreign-Other, E. German-
German, E. German-other, immigrant)
FI: 2 categories (Finnish-speaking, Swedish-
speaking)
SW: Not available.
Region Dummy variable defined by country:
AU: 7 categories (New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland, Southern Australia, Western Australia,
Tasmania, A.C.T and N.T.)
CN: 10 categories (Newfoundland, Prince Edward
Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia)
UK: 11 categories (North, Yorkshire and Humberside
North West, East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia,
Greater London, South East, South West, Wales,
Scotland, Northern Ireland)
US: 9 categories (New England, Middle Atlantic, East
North Central, North Central, South Atlantic, East South
Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific)
GE: 16 categories (West Berlin, Schleswig Holstein,
Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine
Westfalia, Hesse, Rhineland, Badenwurttemburg,
Bavaria, East Berlin, Mecklenburg, Brandenburg,
Sachsen, Thueringen, Saxony)
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FI: 11 categories (Uusimaa, Turku/Pori, Home,
Kymi, North Karelia, Kuopio, Central Finland, Vaasa,
Oulu, Lapland, other)
SW: 7 categories (Stockholm, bigger cities, south,
north, north sparsely populated, Gothenburg, Malmo)
Urban Dummy variables defined by country:
AU: 2 categories (state capital, rest of country)
CN: 6 categories (urban 500,000+, urban 100,000 to
499,999, urban 30,000-99,999, urban 2,500-29,999, urban
<2,500, rural)
UK: 5 categories (Greater London, Metropolitan
districts and central Clyde, non metropolitan, 3.2+
persons, non-metropolitan 0.9-3.2 persons, non
metropolitan under 0.9 persons)
US: 9 categories (city<1,000,000, city 1-2.5 million,
city 2.5-5 million, city >5 million, suburb <1,000,000,
suburb 1-2.5 million, suburb 2.5-5 million, suburb>5
million, non-metropolitan)
GE: Not available.
FI: 2 categories (urban, non-urban)
SW: 6 categories
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Appendix 2: Means of Family Status Variables Used in Employment
and Wage Models
A. Employment models
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .731 .732 .737 .625 .698 .773 .763
Child <1 .077 .068 .080 .064 .003 .052 .030
Child 1-5 .269 .259 .299 .294 .210 .272 .323
Child 6-17 .321 .342 .315 .322 .454 .387 .305
B. Wage models
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .708 .740 .764 .6021 .673 .748 .763
One child .187 .226 .219 .241 .292 .274 .207
Two children .251 .283 .281 .253 .245 .289 .327
Three or more
children
.109 .108 .098 .132 .056 .119 .154
Note: Means of other variables used in the models, and complete regression results,
are available from the authors on request.
